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Abstract
Previous experimental results on one-shot sequential two-player games show that group de-
cisions are closer to the subgame-perfect Nash equilbirum than individual decisions. We extend
the analysis of inter-group versus inter-individual decision making to a Stackelberg market game,
by running both one-shot and repeated markets. Whereas in the one-shot markets we ￿nd no
signi￿cant di⁄erences in the behavior of groups and individuals, we ￿nd that the behavior of
groups is further away from the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the stage game than that of
individuals. To a large extent, this result is independent of the method of eliciting choices
(sequential or strategy method) and the method used to account for observed ￿rst- and second-
mover behavior. We provide evidence on followers￿response functions and electronic chats to
o⁄er an explanation for the di⁄erential e⁄ect that the time horizon of interaction has on the
extent of individual and group players￿(non)conformity with subgame perfectness.
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11 Introduction
Many decisions in private, public, and business life are not taken by individuals, but by groups of
individuals. Think, for instance, of households, public authorities, court juries, boards of directors,
or management teams.1 However, much of economic theory does not distinguish between decisions
taken by individuals or groups. Also, until recently, experimental economists were mainly concerned
with testing economic models using individuals as decision makers. Various authors rightly point
out that in the presence of systematic di⁄erences in decisions made by individuals and groups,
it would be risky to export results observed in interindividual decision making to domains where
groups interact with each other (see, e.g., Cooper and Kagel, 2005).
Recently growing experimental research on interindividual-intergroup comparisons has so
far derived the result that, indeed, often there are di⁄erences in the behavior of individuals and
groups. More precisely, although there are exceptions, one result that emerges from the literature
is that often groups appear to be more sel￿sh than individuals. This has mainly been shown in
the context of two classes of games. The ￿rst class consists of simple, sequential-move, two-player
games such as the ultimatum game (Bornstein and Yaniv 1998, and Robert and Carnevale 1997),
the trust game (Cox 2002, and Kugler at al. 2007), the centipede game (Bornstein et al. 2004),
and the gift-exchange game (Kocher and Sutter 2007).2 Bornstein (2008, p. 30) summarizes much
of this literature by stating that
￿Groups, it seems, are more sel￿sh and more sophisticated players than individuals,
and, as a result, interactions between two unitary groups are closer to the rational,
game-theoretical solution than interactions between two individuals.￿
Note that the literature Bornstein summarizes in this quote is based on experimental games
in which individuals and groups interact only once. The second class consists of games that authors
characterize as having a ￿Eureka￿ component, meaning that once the solution or equilibrium is
found, it is recognized as a clear solution of the game. Based on results from, e.g., signaling games
1For example, the chairman￿ s o¢ ce of the News Corporation is a group of ￿ve persons meeting every week to
consider ￿every acquisition and item of capital expenditure￿(FT May 20th, 2003). More generally, the organization
literature has a long tradition of analyzing the role of management teams in ￿rms. As Finkelstein and Hambrick
(1996) point out, decision makers are informed, in￿ uenced and sometimes constrained by others, both inside and
outside the organization.
2One exception is provided by Cason and Mui￿ s (1997) dictator games where, in some cases, group dictators give
more than individual dictators. In their re-examination, Luhan et al. (2009) report team dictators to be more sel￿sh
than individual dictators.
2(Cooper and Kagel, 2005) and beauty contests (Kocher and Sutter, 2005), Sutter et al. (2009, p.
391) state that
￿It can be considered a stylized fact in the literature that teams are generally closer to
game-theoretic predictions than individuals in (interactive) games in which rationality
and correct reasoning are the predominant task characteristics.￿
Moreover, to the extent that groups and individuals converge to the same equilibrium in
these repeated ￿Eureka￿ -type games, groups are found to do so much faster than individuals.
In this paper we contribute to the literature on interindividual-intergroup comparisons by
studying a Stackelberg market game which, arguably, belongs to the ￿rst class of games above. A
particular aim is to study the e⁄ect the time horizon of interaction has on the behavior of individuals
and groups￿ a topic that has not yet been thoroughly studied in this class of games. Our results
are in (partial) contrast to the quotes above. In fact, in our one-shot Stackelberg markets we ￿nd
no signi￿cant di⁄erences in the behavior of groups and individuals, and in our repeated Stackelberg
markets we ￿nd that the behavior of groups is further away from the subgame-perfect equilibrium
than that of individuals. That is, we show that once a simple sequential-move game (belonging
to the class of games summarized by Bornstein, 2008) is repeated, the behavior of groups relative
to that of individuals goes in the opposite direction to what is stated in Bornstein￿ s summary. In
particular, group play diverges from the (re￿ned) game-theoretic solution.
The Stackelberg (1934) model is among the most frequently applied models of oligopolistic
competition. In a Stackelberg duopoly market game, one ￿rm (the ￿rst mover) makes its quantity
decision ￿rst. Then, knowing the ￿rst mover￿ s choice, the other ￿rm (the second mover) decides
on its quantity, before the market clears. In case of linear market demand and symmetric and
constant marginal costs, in the subgame perfect equilibrium the ￿rst mover produces and earns
twice as much as the second mover. Moreover, the second mover￿ s best response is a linear and
downward sloping function of the leader￿ s quantity choice.3 We chose a Stackelberg game because
it has a very attractive feature: For each of the ￿rst mover￿ s quantity choice, a second mover can,
by its own quantity choice, express a wide range of preferences over own and the other player￿ s
income.4
3Experimental evidence on individual-player Stackelberg duopoly markets and how they compare to simultaneous-
move Cournot duopoly markets is reported in Huck et al. (2001).
4This feature distinguishes the Stackelberg game from other sequential games such as the ultimatum game or the
trust game.
3We implement this market game both as one-period and as multiple-period games by having
either individuals or groups of three subjects act in the role of the ￿rst and the second mover.
Subjects acting in groups have to agree unanimously on the quantity produced. The decision-
making process within groups is aided by access to a chat tool. The members of a group are able
to exchange written messages until they reach a joint decision.
Comparing ￿rst mover quantities across treatments is straightforward. In the one-period
games we ￿nd that although the average group leader quantity is somewhat higher than the av-
erage individual leader quantity, the di⁄erence is insigni￿cant. In the multiple-period games, in
contrast, we ￿nd that average leader quantities chosen by groups are signi￿cantly lower than aver-
age leader quantities chosen by individuals. Comparing second mover behavior across treatments
is less straightforward as we observe followers￿choices in response to varying ￿rst mover choices.
Nevertheless, for the one-period games we ￿nd that, if anything, the observed average response
function of groups is closer to the best-response function than that of individuals, which is in
line with earlier experimental results. But, again, we fail to detect statistical di⁄erences. In the
multiple-period game treatments, average observed reaction functions of followers display a speci￿c
non-monotonic pattern not predicted by standard theory. However, this pattern is predicted and
can be accounted for by models of other-regarding preferences. We use maximum-likelihood tech-
niques to estimate average follower response functions for the multiple-period treatments, using
either Lau and Leung￿ s (2010) implementation of the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model of inequality
aversion or the Cox et al. (2007) model of emotion-driven reciprocity. As the standard rational
best response function of followers is nested in both of these models, we have a clear and unam-
biguous method to test which of two observed average response functions is closer to the prediction
of subgame perfectness. Irrespective of which of the two models we use to account for followers￿
reaction functions, we ￿nd that the one employed by groups is further away from the rational best
response function than that of individuals.
Since individuals and groups partly choose markedly di⁄erent quantities as ￿rst movers,
di⁄erences we observe in individual and group second-mover decisions might be driven by di⁄erent
experiences second movers make in the individual and the relevant group-player treatments. We
control for this by also eliciting choices in four additional treatments employing the strategy method
(Selten, 1967) in which, simultaneously with the ￿rst movers making their decision, the second
movers have to indicate how they would react to each of the ￿rst movers￿quantities. Thus, this
method gives us the complete response function of second movers. The results of the control
4treatments largely con￿rm the results obtained in the main treatments with truly sequential play.
In the one-shot sessions, behavior appears to be in line with results reported in the literature
as group leaders and followers are closer to the prediction of subgame perfectness, although the
di⁄erences are insigni￿cant. In the multiple-period treatments, we ￿nd, again, that in comparison
to individuals, groups choose lower leader quantities and employ response functions that are further
away from the rational best response function.
Our paper makes two main contributions. The literature reports so far that in the class of
simple, two-player, sequential-move games groups often appear to be closer to the game-theoretic
prediction than individuals if the game is played only once. We show for a game belonging to
this class of games that once the game is repeated, the result is turned around in the sense that
groups are shown to be further away from the game-theoretic prediction. The Stackelberg market
game is, arguably, not a ￿Eureka￿ -type problem that has a clear solution, which, once found, is
clearly seen as such by players. Instead, a Stackelberg duopoly market is a game that, like the
other games summarized by Bornstein (2008), leave more room for other-regarding preferences.
In these games, the presence of pro￿t-maximizing and other-regarding motives might play out
di⁄erently depending on whether the game is played by groups or by individuals and depending on
the time horizon of interaction. In fact, to explain our results, in the discussion section we provide
evidence that there is heterogeneity in subjects￿types. Concentrating on second movers, we ￿nd
that they are often either myopic pro￿t maximizers (who always best respond to a ￿rst mover￿ s
quantity), strategic rewarders and punishers, or preference-driven rewarders and punishers.5 The
latter two types￿behavior is indistinguishable until the last period (until which both types employ
a reward-and-punishment scheme). In the last period, however, strategic punishers and rewarders
play rational best response, while preference-driven punishers and rewarders continue to employ a
reward-and-punishment scheme. These varying types of subjects play largely una⁄ected by each
other in the individual treatments, but do in￿ uence each other via group discussions in the group
treatments. We illustrate how this can lead to di⁄erent results depending on the di⁄erent time
horizons adopted in our and earlier experiments. Our results suggest that the apparent consensus
in the literature regarding sequential two-player games, as summarized by the Bornstein (2008)
quote above, needs to be modi￿ed to accommodate for di⁄erential e⁄ects of the time horizon of
interaction and possibly other design features￿ a point we discuss in more detail in the concluding
5This categorization is reminiscent of types in public-good games identi￿ed in Fischbacher et al. (2001) or, more
recently, Reuben and Suetens (in press).
5section. In any case, the answer to the question of who behaves more like a game theorist, groups
or individuals, is not independent of the time horizon of interaction.
Our second main contribution is on a methodological level. We run both one-period and
multiple-period games and employ the strategy method for the ￿rst time in a ￿group￿experiment
and in a repeated Stackelberg market game.6 Doing so not only enables us to control for di⁄erent
￿rst-mover actions across treatments, but also to uncover the shape of complete response functions
in (repeated) individual and group Stackelberg markets. The heterogeneity in followers￿behavior
mentioned above implies that average response functions in both the individual and the team
treatments show a somewhat surprising pattern: they slope downward for low leader quantities,
slope upward for intermediate leader quantities (around the Cournot quantity), and slope downward
again for higher leader quantities. This result suggests that it is appropriate to account for response
functions in e.g. sequential market games by running simple linear regressions. As other authors
and we demonstrate, structural estimation of other-regarding preference models are able to account
for the shape of average and complete individual response functions and thus o⁄er theory-driven
alternatives to account for follower behavior.7
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the
related literature, concentrating mainly on earlier studies of interindividual and intergroup decision
making in sequential two-player games. Section 3 introduces the experimental design and the main
hypothesis. In Section 4 we report our results and present the estimations of structural models
accounting for second-mover behavior. In Section 5 we discuss our results and Section 6 provides
a summary and o⁄ers some concluding remarks.
2 Related literature
There are now a considerable number of studies comparing behavior of individuals and groups in
experimental games. We mainly con￿ne our overview to the papers most relevant for our purposes,
that is, to sequential two-player games and market games. Doing so, we only very brie￿ y describe
the main results of these studies while providing design details of the most relevant studies in Table
8 in Section A of the Web Appendix. Bornstein (2008) and Engel (2010) provide more complete
6Huck and Wallace (2002) elicit complete-response functions in a one-shot Stackelberg experiment. However, we
will show that the behavior these authors and we elicit in one-shot games does not (fully) re￿ ect the behavior of
subjects and groups who are given the opportunity to learn over the course of various rounds of play.
7Note that observed behavior is in line with that predicted by social-preference models, despite the fact that we
use non-neutral ￿￿rm￿language in the instructions and employ random-matching in the multiple-period treatments
to weaken other-regarding motives.
6overviews of the experimental literature on the behavior of groups.
The early studies on group decision making focus on the ultimatum game. Bornstein and
Yaniv (1998) ￿nd that groups in the role of the proposer o⁄er less than individuals, and groups
in the role of the responder show a willingness to accept less. Robert and Carnevale (1997) also
analyzed an ultimatum game, in which, however, no responders were present. These authors ￿nd
similar results as Bornstein and Yaniv (1998) with respect to proposers.
Subsequent studies replicate this ￿nding in other games. Cox (2002) analyze a trust game
(Berg et al. 1995) and reports no di⁄erences between groups and individuals playing the role of
the trustor. However, groups in the role of the trustee are reported to return signi￿cantly less
than individuals. Kugler et al. (2007), on the other hand, ￿nd that groups are less trusting than
individuals, but just as trustworthy. However, if there are di⁄erences, both studies point in the
direction of more sel￿sh behavior on the part of groups. Kocher and Sutter (2007) analyze a gift-
exchange game and ￿nd that groups acting in the role of the employer and of the employee choose
lower wages and, in return, lower e⁄ort levels, respectively, than individuals. Bornstein et al. (2004)
have both individuals and groups play two centipede games and report that groups exit the game
signi￿cantly earlier than individuals. One exception is reported by Cason and Mui (1997) in a
dictator game. They note that in some cases, group dictators give more than individual dictators.
A recent re-examination by Luhan et al. (2009) indicates that group dictators are more sel￿sh than
individuals, possibly caused by replacing the face-to-face discussion among group members with
an electronic chat. Bosman et al. (2006) study a power-to-take game where ￿rst movers can claim
any part of the second movers￿income. Then, second movers decide how much of the income to
destroy. The authors do not ￿nd any di⁄erences between groups and individuals both in terms of
the ￿rst-mover take rates and the income destroyed.
Some studies compare the behavior of groups and individuals in market settings. Bornstein
et al. (2008), building on work by Bornstein and Gneezy (2002), analyze Bertrand price competition
between individuals and between groups. They ￿nd that winning prices were signi￿cantly lower
in competition between two- or three-person groups than in competition between individuals. In
contrast to the results of Bornstein et al. (2008), Raab and Schipper (2009) ￿nd no di⁄erences in
behavior of individuals or groups in Cournot competition. Note, however, that earlier studies show
that the Nash equilibrium is a good predictor in individual-player Cournot markets (see, e.g., Huck
et al. 2004). Cooper and Kagel (2005) analyze limit-pricing games (Milgrom and Roberts 1982) and
report that teams consistently play more strategically and learn faster than individuals. A similar
7￿nding is reported in Kocher and Sutter (2005) in a beauty-contest game. Feri et al. (2010) report
that groups can coordinate more e¢ ciently than individuals.
In sum, it seems fair to say that most studies that ￿nd di⁄erences in interindividual and
intergroup comparison ￿nd that groups tend to behave more in line with game theoretic predictions,
appear more sel￿sh, and show less regard for others, leading Bornstein (2008) and Sutter et al.
(2009) to the summaries stated in the Introduction.
3 Experimental design, procedures, and hypotheses
3.1 The Stackelberg duopoly game and its predictions
In our Stackelberg duopoly game, two ￿rms face inverse demand function p = maxf30 ￿ Q;0g
where Q denotes total quantity. Both players have constant unit costs of c = 6 and no ￿xed cost.
Firms choose their quantities sequentially. First, the Stackelberg leader (L) decides on its quantity
qL, then, knowing qL; the Stackelberg follower (F) decides on its quantity qF. The subgame perfect
equilibrium is given by qL = 12 and the follower￿ s best-reply function qF(qL) = 12￿0:5qL, yielding
qF = 6 in equilibrium. Joint pro￿ts are maximized if qL +qF = 12 and the Nash equilibrium of the
simultaneous-move game (Cournot market) predicts qL = qF = 8:
The following two motivations lead us to choose a Stackelberg game. First, in contrast to
other sequential two-player games, a second mover in a Stackelberg game has a much richer strategy
space. For instance, in an ultimatum game the choice set of the responder is a binary set containing
just two alternatives, ￿accept￿and ￿reject￿ . By contrast, a second mover in a Stackelberg game has
much more room to react to a leader￿ s action, both positively and negatively. As Cox et al. (2008,
p. 33) point out ￿The [Stackelberg] duopoly games are especially useful because the follower￿ s
opportunity sets [...] have a parabolic space that enables the follower to reveal a wide range of
positive and negative trade-o⁄s between her own income and the leader￿ s income.￿ The second
motivation concerns potential results. Huck et al. (2001), who use the same market speci￿cation as
introduced above, ￿nd in their individual-player Stackelberg games that, on average, ￿rst movers
produce less and second movers produce more than predicted by theory. Hence, there is room for


















Seq-Ind-1 Yes No Yes No 1 18 9
Seq-Team-1 Yes No No Yes 1 36 6
Sm-Ind-1 No Yes Yes No 1 18 9
Sm-Team-1 No Yes No Yes 1 36 6
Seq-Ind-15 Yes No Yes No 15 36 6
Seq-Team-15 Yes No No Yes 15 72 4
Sm-Ind-15 No Yes Yes No 15 36 6
Sm-Team-15 No Yes No Yes 15 72 4
Table 1: Experimental design
3.2 Treatment design
Our experiment is based on a 2￿2￿2 factorial design, varying the number of periods of interaction
(1 period or 15 periods), varying who acts in the two player positions of the Stackelberg game
(individuals or groups), and varying the method of eliciting choices (truly sequential play or strat-
egy method). We refer to the eight treatments as follows. The one-shot individual and group
treatments with truly sequential play are called ￿Seq-Ind-1￿and ￿Seq-Team-1￿ , while the one-
shot individual and group treatments which employ the strategy method are called ￿Sm-Ind-1￿
and ￿Sm-Team-1￿ . The corresponding multiple-period treatments are, respectively, called, ￿Seq-
Ind-15￿ , ￿Seq-Team-15￿ , ￿Sm-Ind-15￿ , and ￿Sm-Team-15￿ . Table 1 gives an overview of the
design. Information about pro￿ts was given in the form of a payo⁄ table (see Table 10 in the Web
Appendix). Next, we describe the setting in each of the four treatments in detail.
Treatments Seq-Ind: These are baseline treatments that are similar to the Stackelberg
experiment in Huck et al. (2001). In each period, the ￿rst mover chose a quantity (selected a
row in the payo⁄ table). Knowing the quantity chosen by the ￿rst mover, the second mover then
decided about his own quantity (selected a column in the table).
Treatments Seq-Team: These are the team baseline treatments which were, with respect
to timing, identical to the Seq-Ind treatments except that players were teams (consisting of three
participants each) instead of individuals. To reach a joint decision, members of a team could
exchange messages within their team via an electronic chat box.8 There were no restrictions
regarding the contents of messages sent, except that (a) the discussion must be in English; (b) the
language used should be civil; and (c) subjects cannot identify themselves by revealing their names,
8Electronic chat helps maintain the anonymity among subjects. As this paper is about studying how groups
di⁄er from individuals, it is preferable to use electronic chat to exclude the possible in￿ uences of other attributes
(say, physical attractiveness) on communication.
9seat numbers, etc. Subjects could enter their quantity decisions into a box in the decision screen
and were then able to submit them to the other group members. All submitted quantity decisions
of own group members then appeared on the screen of each group member. As long as not all
submitted quantity decisions were the same, the chat box remained open and group members could
continue discussing their decision. When all submitted quantity decisions of a team￿ s members
were the same, the decision screen (including the chat box) disappeared and subjects had to wait
until the experiment continued.
Treatments Sm-Ind: In these treatments, individual ￿rst and second movers made decisions
according to the strategy method. That is, ￿rst movers decided about a single quantity, while
second movers were, at the same time, asked to make a quantity decision for each of the 13 possible
quantities the ￿rst mover could choose. Once all subjects had made their decisions, the computer
randomly matched ￿rst and second movers, and selected the relevant quantity of the second mover
(that is, the quantity the second mover chose for the quantity chosen by the ￿rst mover).
Treatments Sm-Team: These treatments are similar to treatments Sm-Ind, except that
players are groups instead of individuals. The same communication technology as in treatments
Seq-Team were employed to facilitate group decisions. In particular, each member of a second-
mover group had to indicate an entire strategy consisting of how it would react to each of the 13
possible choices of a ￿rst-mover team. At any point in the process of entering this strategy, second-
mover group members could submit their strategy (entered so far) to the other group members.
Similar to the individual-player treatments, all entered quantities submitted so far appeared on
the screen of each group member. There were no restrictions regarding the order in which follower
quantities for the 13 possible ￿rst-mover choices had to be entered on the decision screen. Again,
the chat box remained open as long as group members had not yet entered the same complete
strategy.
3.3 Experimental procedures
The experiment with 18 sessions was conducted at CentER Lab of Tilburg University in April,
May, October 2009, and September 2010. Each session consisted of 18 subjects. A total number
of 324 Tilburg University students participated in the study. Each subject took part in only one
session. Each session consisted of either 1 period or 15 periods. In the repeated sessions, all 15
periods of play counted toward ￿nal earnings. There were no practice periods at the beginning of
any session. On average, a one-shot session lasted about 45 minutes, whereas the repeated sessions
10lasted about 1 hour and 45 minutes (including the time to read the instructions and payment of
the subjects). On average, a subject in a one-shot (repeated) session earned e7.29 (e18.51). The
experiment was programmed and conducted with the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007).
At the beginning of each session, subjects were randomly assigned to be either a ￿rst or
second mover, and these roles remained ￿xed throughout the entire session. In the team treatments,
a team was formed by three randomly selected players who belonged to the same team for the
entire experiment.9 Hence, a team-treatment session consisted of three ￿rst-mover teams and three
second-mover teams. First-mover and second-mover teams were randomly rematched with each
other in each of the 15 periods of the repeated game treatments. In order to control for the size of
the random matching group, the 18 subjects in an individual-player session were divided into three
cohorts of six subjects (three ￿rst and three second movers), and matching happened only within
cohorts. This is explained in the instructions.
The instructions used non-neutral language, referring, e.g., to ￿￿rms,￿￿product,￿or ￿prof-
its.￿With the instructions, subjects received a payo⁄ table (see the Web Appendix) which, to ease
comparison, was the same as used in Huck et al. (2001). The payo⁄ table showed all possible
combinations of quantity choices and the corresponding pro￿ts. The numbers given in the payo⁄
table were measured in a ￿ctitious currency unit called ￿Points￿ . Each ￿rm could choose a quan-
tity from the set f3;4;:::;15g: The payo⁄ table was generated according to the demand and cost
functions given above.10 In each period, each individual ￿rst- or second-mover earned the amount
indicated in the table for the selected quantity combination of both ￿rms. In the team treatments,
each member of a ￿rst- or second-mover ￿rm also earned the amount indicated in the table for the
selected quantity combination of both ￿rms.
In the 15-period treatments, ￿rst and second movers (individuals or teams) were randomly
rematched with each other in each period.11 In the repeated game treatments and starting from
9There is a large body of social psychology literature on the size of a small group. The majority stipulate that
the lower bound should be three people, for ￿a dyad (that is, two persons) is a much simpler social system￿ (see
Fisher, 1980).
10Due to the discreteness of the strategy space, such a payo⁄ table typically induces multiple equilibria (see Holt,
1985). To avoid this, the bi￿ matrix representing the payo⁄ table was slightly manipulated. By subtracting one
Point in 14 of the 169 entries we ensured uniqueness of both the Cournot￿ Nash equilibrium and the subgame perfect
Stackelberg equilibrium.
11Random matching across repetitions was also employed in the team versus individual play signaling games
reported in Cooper and Kagel (2005). Note that, given the choice of a multiple-period treatment, random matching
across periods constitutes a minimal change compared to a one-shot treatment. It is left for further research to
analyze the e⁄ect of ￿xed matching across periods on interindividual and intergroup comparisons in our Stackelberg
market game. In the light of our results, we hypothesize that the behavior of groups might be even further away from
subgame perfect behavior than that of individuals if one employs ￿xed matching across multiple rounds of play.
11the second period, subjects were informed about the results of the previous round in their own
market, including the quantity of the ￿rst mover, the (relevant) quantity of the second mover, and
own pro￿ts.
3.4 Hypothesis
Recall that the Stackelberg market game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Hence, the
unique subgame perfect equilibrium of a repeated Stackelberg market game is to play the unique
subgame perfect equilibrium of the stage game in each period of interaction. This implies that the
rational behavior in each period is described by the subgame perfect equilibrium of the stage game,
even if our subjects in the 15-period treatments viewed the experiment as a ￿nitely repeated game,
despite the fact that we employed random-matching across periods. However, in the experimental
economics literature it is known that play in ￿nitely repeated interactions might be more coop-
erative even if the stage-game equilibrium is unique and subjects are randomly rematched across
rounds within relatively small groups (see, e.g., Selten and Stoecker 1986, or Andreoni and Miller
1993). Yet, in repeated interactions it is a priori not clear how groups will behave in comparison
to individuals. Will groups have a tendency towards more sel￿sh behavior in comparison to in-
terindividual interaction as suggested by the earlier literature reviewed in Section 2? Or will there
be a trend towards more cooperation in intergroup interaction as this, in the long run, promises
higher pro￿ts? The few studies reported in the economics literature ￿nd that groups in repeated
interactions play more strategically and converge more quickly to the stage game equilibrium than
individuals (Cooper and Kagel, 2005 and Kocher and Sutter, 2005). Hence, based on these earlier
results and those reviewed in Section 2, we should expect groups to be behave more in accor-
dance with the prediction of subgame perfectness than individuals in both the one-period and the
multiple-period treatments. More precisely:
Hypothesis: Group ￿rst movers will choose quantities closer to the Stackelberg leader quantity
than individual ￿rst movers, and group second movers￿response functions will be closer to
the standard best response function than that of individual second movers, independent of
the duration of the interaction.
124 Experimental results
We report the results in two sections with the purpose of comparing behavior of individuals and
groups in related treatments. The ￿rst section brie￿ y presents summary statistics of our treat-
ments, formal tests for di⁄erences in ￿rst mover behavior, and visual evidence of second mover
behavior. In the second section we concentrate exclusively on second-mover behavior in the 15-
period treatments, as accounting for it and formally testing for di⁄erences across treatments is
much less straightforward than in the case of ￿rst movers. In fact, to account for the observed
non-monotonic second-mover behavior, we are led to estimate two social preference models: the
(simpli￿ed) inequality-aversion model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) as put forward by Lau and Leung
(2010), and the parametric model of emotion-driven reciprocity by Cox et al. (2007). To purge the
data of learning e⁄ects at the beginning of the 15-period sessions (especially in the strategy-method
treatments) and, at the same time, preserve su¢ cient power for maximum-likelihood estimations,
in the results section we report and use data from periods 3-15, if not otherwise indicated.
4.1 A ￿rst look at the data
Table 2 presents summary statistics of average quantity choices and payo⁄s for each treatment.
The results of the 1-period (15-periods) treatments are presented in the upper (lower) half of this
Table. For the strategy-method treatments, only the relevant quantities of the second movers are
taken into account (i.e., only quantity choices of second movers at quantities actually chosen by
￿rst movers).
In all treatments, we note that average ￿rst-mover quantities are clearly smaller and average
second-mover quantities clearly larger than the predictions along the subgame perfect equilibrium
path, which predicts quantity 12 for ￿rst and quantity 6 for second movers. To facilitate comparison,
note that the average ￿rst (second) mover quantity observed in the 10-period random-matching
Stackelberg game of Huck et al. (2001) was 10.19 (8.32). Hence, average quantities of 10.37 (7.77)
chosen in our treatment Seq-Ind-15 (which comes closest in terms of design features to this earlier
study) are similar to those reported in Huck et al. (2001).
4.1.1 First-mover behavior
In the 1-period experiments we observe that average leader quantities in the individual treatments
are slightly lower than in the corresponding group treatments. By contrast, in the 15-period
13Prediction Sequential Play Strategy Method
Seq-Ind Seq-Team Sm-Ind Sm-Team



















































































































Notes: Standard errors of the mean in parentheses.
Table 2: Summary of experimental results: Average quantities and payo⁄s
experiments we observe that average leader quantities in the individual treatments are higher than
in the corresponding group treatments. To test for signi￿cance of di⁄erences in ￿rst-mover data,
we ran regressions of the form qL
ijt = ￿0 + ￿1 ￿ TREATM + "ijt where qL
ijt is the quantity chosen
by leader subject/group i in session j in period t; and TREATM is the dummy to code the two
treatments that are included in the regression. The coe¢ cient ￿1 measures the di⁄erence in average
￿rst-mover quantities in the two treatments included in the regression. A test of the hypothesis H0:
￿1 = 0 will show whether or not the di⁄erence is signi￿cant. In order to account for possible non-
independence of observations in the 15-period treatments, we ran the regressions clustering data by
subject or group and by session and using general linear latent and mixed models, GLLAMM (Rabe-
Hesketh and Skrondal, 2005). The results are reported in Table 3,12 where the main comparisons
12Using Tobit regression techniques delivers very similar results.
14Estimates for the coe¢ cient ￿1: H0: ￿1 = 0:
Comparison based on player types Comparison based on elicitation method
Seq-Ind Sm-Ind Seq-Ind Seq-Team
versus versus versus versus



















Notes: Estimated equation: qL
ijt = ￿0 +￿1 ￿TREATM +"ijt, where qL
ijt is the quantity chosen by ￿rst-mover
subject/group i in session j in period t and TREATM is a dummy used to code the treatments included in the
regressions. In all regressions, the dummy variable TREATM is coded such that it is equal to 1 for the treatment
mentioned in the upper entry in each column of this table and it is equal to 0 for the treatment mentioned in the
lower entry in each column. We report as p-levels P > j t j: ￿￿￿, ￿ indicates signi￿cance at the 1%, 10% level.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 3: Results of statistical tests for di⁄erences in ￿rst-mover choices
between related individual and group player treatments are presented in the ￿rst two columns.
The test results in Table 3 indicate that none of the di⁄erences in ￿rst-mover behavior
between individual and group player treatments are signi￿cant in the 1-period treatments. However,
￿rst movers in treatment Seq-Ind-15 choose signi￿cantly higher quantities than ￿rst movers in the
corresponding team treatment Seq-Team-15. This contradicts our hypothesis. Note that average
￿rst-mover choices in treatment Sm-Ind-15 and the corresponding team treatment Sm-Team-15
do not di⁄er signi￿cantly.
For completeness, in column 3 and 4 of Table 3 we also report results across the two
individual and the two team treatments, for both sets of experiments.
4.1.2 Second-mover behavior
Let us ￿rst consider second-mover behavior in the 1-period treatments. Figure 1 shows the average
response function observed in the 1-period treatments (for the sequential-play treatments in the
left and for the strategy-method treatments in the right panel). As the sequential-play treatments
only deliver a few data points, no clear picture emerges in the left panel of Figure 1. If anything,
the average response function of team players seems to be closer to the rational response function
than that of individual players in the sequential play treatments. A clearer picture emerges in the
right panel showing the average response functions in the strategy-method treatments. We make
15two observations. First, for leader quantities smaller than the Cournot quantity of 8, the average
team response function coincides exactly with the best-response function, whereas the average
response function of individuals runs slightly below the rational response function. The latter
implies that individuals on average have a slight tendency to reward what could be interpreted as
￿nice￿￿rst-mover behavior. Second, for leader quantities larger than the Cournot quantity of 8,
the average response functions of individuals and teams are very similar and both run above the
best response function, implying that both individuals and teams slightly punish what could be
interpreted as ￿greedy￿￿rst-mover behavior. Although there is weak visual evidence indicating
that the observed response functions of teams are closer to the rational best response function than
that of individual players in the 1-period treatments (which is in line with earlier results in the
literature and our hypothesis), the estimation of simple linear response functions do not deliver any





























































Figure 1: Average response functions observed in the one-period sequential treatments (left) and
the one-period strategy-method treatments (right).
Note: There are no observations for leader quantities 10 and 11 in treatment Seq-Ind-1.
Next we turn to second-mover behavior in the 15-period treatments. The two panels in
Figure 2 show the average response functions in the 15-periods truly sequential (left panel) and
the 15-periods strategy-method treatments (right panel). Inspecting the two panels of Figure
2, it seems fair to state that the average observed response functions of team second movers are
further away from the best-response function than that of individual second movers in the 15-period
treatments. Importantly, the two panels in Figure 2 as well as simple diagnostic tools suggest that
16team second movers reward more and punish harder than individual followers.13 Interestingly,
all observed response functions show a particular and perhaps somewhat surprising ￿￿rst slope
downward, then slope upward, then slope downward￿pattern. This is most evident in the strategy-
method treatments. More precisely, the response functions in the strategy-method treatments are
downward sloping for leader choices between 3 and 7, upward-sloping for leader choices between
7 and 11/12, and then slope downward again for higher leader choices. Due to the more limited
number of di⁄erent choices of ￿rst movers in the sequential treatments, this pattern is less clear in





























































Figure 2: Average response functions observed in the 15-period sequential treatments (left) and
the 15-period strategy-method treatments (right).
While estimation of linear and monotonic response functions may serve as a quick diagnostic
tool (see footnote 13), from the preceding discussion we conclude that simple linear estimations are
inappropriate and incapable of accounting for patterns observed in the average and individual re-
sponse functions. Furthermore, although basic patterns are easily identi￿able on the individual and
13Recall that the theoretical response function of followers is given by qF(qL) = 12 ￿ 0:5qL. Estimating such re-
sponse functions as a quick diagnostic tool for our data and comparing the results of the relevant 15-period treatments
delivers the following results (details are provided in Section B of the Web Appendix.): First, both the intercept and
the slope of the response function employed in the individual-player treatment Seq-Ind-15 are signi￿cantly closer
to the ones of the rational best response function than the intercept and slope of the response function in the team-
player treatment Seq-Team-15. This suggests that individual second movers behave more sel￿shly than team second
movers. Second, the reaction function in treatment Seq-Ind is downward-sloping, while the reaction function in
treatment Seq-Team is upward-sloping. This suggests that team followers reward more and punish harder than
individual followers. Third, repeating this exercise for the ￿relevant￿ data (i.e., only second-movers￿reactions at
quantities actually chosen by ￿rst movers) in the 15-period strategy-method treatments con￿rms the result obtained
for the truly sequential treatments.
14Reaction functions on the individual and group level show heterogeneity ranging from best-response behavior
to ￿ at response functions (re￿ ecting a basic reward-and-punishment scheme) to response functions that resemble the
shape of those shown in the right panel of Figure 2. We return to this issue in Section 5.
17team level in the repeated strategy-method treatments, this is not easy in the repeated sequential
treatments as in the latter treatments we observe second-mover behavior only for a possibly small
subset of ￿rst-mover quantities, which leads to identi￿cation and categorization issues. This raises
two problems. First, how can we appropriately account for (average) observed response functions
in the various treatments? Second, how can we formally compare second-mover behavior across
relevant treatments?
We can solve these two problems for the 15-period treatments by employing two recently
suggested structural models. In fact, it turns out that the patterns observed in Figure 2 (and at
the individual and group level) are consistent with the predictions of models of other-regarding
preferences, especially the model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Therefore, in the next section we
will account for followers￿observed response functions by structural estimation of the Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) model of inequality aversion as suggested in Lau and Leung (2010). Furthermore,
we also estimate and discuss Cox et al.￿ s (2007) model of emotion-driven reciprocity. Doing so, we
will ignore what other-regarding motive drives the results. The important point is that irrespective
independent of the model we estimate, individuals appear to be more sel￿sh than teams. We are
able to make this statement as the standard sel￿sh best response function is nested in both of
the social preference models we estimate. Therefore, we have a clear and unambiguous method
to test which of two observed average response functions is closer to the prediction of subgame
perfectness.15
4.1.3 A closer look at follower data: structural estimations
Estimating a model of inequality aversion: Lau and Leung (2010) suggest that the experi-
mental results of the Stackelberg markets reported in Huck et al. (2001) can be accounted for using
a simpli￿ed version of the inequality-aversion model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In particular, Lau
and Leung suggest that the population of second movers consists of a mixture of ￿standard￿and
￿non-standard￿preference types. Standard types are assumed to use the theoretical best-response
function, whereas non-standard types are assumed to act as if maximizing a utility function of
the Fehr and Schmidt type. In their paper, Lau and Leung ￿rst derive the response function of
15Clearly, in the group treatments it is the group decision-making process that maps individual member￿ s prefer-
ences into a decision of the group. Hence, in estimating these models also for the group treatments we maintain an
as-if assumption, according to which a group￿ s decision is a re￿ ection of this ￿group￿ s preferences.￿(See also Kocher
and Sutter, 2007, p. 71) Given the speci￿c non-monotonic shape of the observed response functions of groups and
individuals, we employ these other-regarding preference models as a technical device in order to more adequately
estimate and compare response functions.
18non-standard types. Interestingly, it turns out that this response functions accurately predicts the
shape of the average response functions we observe in our 15-period sessions (see Figure 2). Lau
and Leung then develop a maximum-likelihood model in which a share ￿ns of second movers are
non-standard types and a share of 1 ￿ ￿ns of second movers are standard types. Estimating this
model, using the random-matching Stackelberg data of Huck et al. (2001), they show that a sub-
stantial share (about 40%) of the second movers in Huck et al. (2001) appear to have preferences
of the Fehr-Schmidt type. The fact that in our 15-period strategy-method data we directly observe
individual response functions that are consistent with either those of standard or non-standard
types is a rationale to apply Lau and Leung￿ s model to our data to account for follower behavior.
In the following we will brie￿ y introduce the model put forward by Lau and Leung, closely following
their exposition. We will then estimate it for our four treatments.
Denote player i and j￿ s payo⁄s by ￿i and ￿j; respectively. Then, Fehr and Schmidt prefer-
ences are given by
ui = ￿i ￿ ￿i maxf￿j ￿ ￿i;0g ￿ ￿i maxf￿i ￿ ￿j;0g (1)
where 0 ￿ ￿i < 1; ￿i ￿ ￿i; i;j = L;F with i 6= j: The parameter ￿i measures player i￿ s aversion
towards disadvantageous inequality, whereas the parameter ￿i measures player i￿ s aversion towards
advantageous inequality. For estimation purposes, Lau and Leung make two assumptions. First,
they assume that there are two types of second movers. The ￿rst type of second movers have
standard sel￿sh preferences and hence play according to the standard best response. These second
movers are referred to as standard types (S). The second type of players have Fehr-Schmidt prefer-
ences and maximize utility as given in 1. These second movers are referred to as non-standard types
(NS). Second, Lau and Leung assume that all non-standard types have the same (dis)advantageous
inequality parameter. Hence, ￿i = a and ￿i = b for all non-standard players. Lau and Leung
assume that the share of non-standard types in the population is given by ￿ns 2 [0;1] where ￿ns is
to be estimated from the data. Hence, the basic assumptions of Lau and Leung￿ s simpli￿ed version
of the Fehr-Schmidt model are as follows: Pr(￿i = a & ￿i = b) = ￿ns; Pr(￿i = ￿i = 0) = 1 ￿ ￿ns;
where 0 ￿ ￿ns < 1; 0 ￿ b < 1; b ￿ a:
Recall from above that a standard-type follower reacts according to the best response func-
tion given by qS
F(qL) = 12 ￿ 1
2qL: Regarding the response function of non-standard followers, Lau
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the best-response function is piecewise linear and that the standard best response is obtained when
a = b = 0. Note also that it slopes downward for low, slopes upward for intermediate, and slopes
downward again for high ￿rst-mover quantities. Hence, it predicts the pattern observed in Figure
2. To brie￿ y gain some intuition, consider the case of qL 2 A. Best responding to such a quantity
choice maximizes a second mover￿ s pro￿t but reduces the utility of a non-standard type due to
advantageous inequality. If qL is small enough, the non-standard second mover ￿nds it preferable
to reduce quantity below the best response, which reduces advantageous inequality by more than
that it decreases own pro￿ts.
To derive the likelihood function, let xi and yi represent the ith observed tuple of observed
leader and follower choices. Lau and Leung assume that a follower with standard [non-standard]
preferences chooses according to yi = qS
F(xi) + "i [yi = qNS
F (xi) + "i], where "i is iid according to
a normal distribution N(0;￿2) and qS
F(xi) and qNS
F (xi) are as given above. Since Lau and Leung
assume a share ￿ns of non-standard and a share of 1￿￿ns standard second movers, the probability
density of observing yi is given by
(1 ￿ ￿ns) ￿ fS(yijxi;￿) + ￿ns ￿ fNS(yijxi;a;b;￿);
where fS(yi j xi;￿) and fNS(yi j xi;a;b;￿), respectively, are the probability densities of observing
yi when the second mover has, respectively, standard and non-standard preferences.16 The log
likelihood function of observing the sample (xi;yi)
NTreatm
i=1 of leader and follower choices is then






































































20Truly Sequential Play Strategy Method
All Data Relevant Data

















































LL ￿427.864 ￿198.222 ￿4599.221 ￿3334.489 ￿436.902 ￿262.242
N 234 156 2535 1690 173 156
Hypothesis aSeq-Ind-15 = aSeq-Team-15 aSm-Ind-15 = aSm-Team-15 aSm-Ind-15 = aSm-Team-15
Testing & & &
bSeq-Ind-15 = bSeq-Team-15 bSm-Ind-15 = bSm-Team-15 bSm-Ind-15 = bSm-Team-15
p = 0:075 (￿2
(2) = 5:17) p = 0:077 (￿2
(2) = 5:14) p = 0:000 (￿2
(2) = 28:72)
Table 4: Estimation results for Lau-Leung￿ s (2010) implementation of the Fehr and Schmidt model













(1 ￿ ￿ns)fS(yi) + ￿ns
h
fA(yi)1￿DB(xi)￿DC(xi) ￿ fB(yi)DB(xi) ￿ fC(yi)DC(xi)
io
;
where NTreatm is the number of observations in the treatment under consideration. To control for
non-independence of observations, we cluster standard errors on individuals or groups.
In an e⁄ort to ￿rst estimate the average response functions as shown in Figure 2, we set
￿ns = 1; that is, in a ￿rst step we assume that there are only non-standard types. The estimation
results are given in Table 4.17
We note that the parameter estimates of the inequality-aversion parameters a and b are
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from 0 in all treatments and data sets. Note also that the parameter estimates
of a and b are in line with the restrictions 0 ￿ b < 1 and b ￿ a imposed by the Fehr and Schmidt
1710 out of 4998 choice pairs result in negative payo⁄s to both players (1 in Seq-Team-15; 3 in Sm-Ind-15 relevant
data; 5 in Sm-Team-15 all data and 1 in Sm-Ind-15 all data). Since the utility function in (1) is de￿ned only for
non-negative payo⁄s, we truncate these observations at qF = 24 ￿ qL which implies zero payo⁄s for both players.
Furthermore, in treatment Sm-Ind-15, seven second movers reacted with quantities above the best-response to ￿rst-
mover quantities smaller than 8. A possible explanation is that individual second movers exposed to the strategy
method are likely to make more errors, especially at ￿rst mover quantities they do not actually observe very often in
the course of the experiment. In the SM treatments (all data), observations from three individuals and two teams
were dropped due to extreme responses to leader quantity 3 and 15, causing di¢ culties in ￿nding convergence.
21model. Most importantly for the purpose of deciding which observed average response function is
closer to the rational best-response function (characterized by a = b = 0), we observe that both the
disadvantageous inequality parameter a and the advantageous inequality parameter b are larger in
the team treatment than in the relevant individual treatment. For instance, while in Seq-Team-15
the parameter a is estimated as 0.629, it is only 0.303 in treatment Seq-Ind-15. This is in contrast
to the main hypothesis according to which the observed response function of teams should be closer
to the rational best-response function than the one of individuals. The test results reported at the
bottom of Table 4 indicate that we can (weakly) reject the hypothesis that, in each of two relevant
treatments comparisons, the parameters a and b are the same.
We next estimate the full model, dropping the restriction ￿ns = 1; and concentrating on
the estimated share of standard and non-standard types in two related treatments. The results are
shown in Table 5. With the exception of treatment Seq-Ind-15, the share ￿ns of nonstandard types
is estimated to be signi￿cantly larger than 0 in all treatments and range from about 0.27 in the
individual treatments to 0.773 in treatment Seq-Team-15. More importantly for our purposes, the
share of non-standard types is estimated to be consistently higher in the group treatments than in
the corresponding individual treatments. These di⁄erences are highly signi￿cant in all treatments
(and data sets), as indicated by the test results presented at the bottom of Table 5.18 This again
is strong evidence against our main hypothesis according to which groups are expected to be more
in line with the predictions of subgame perfectness.
Estimating a model of reciprocity: Recently, the behavior of second-movers in Stackelberg
markets was also accounted for by a model of emotion-driven reciprocity (Cox, Friedman, and
Gjerstad 2007). Clearly, in addition to or besides inequality aversion, reciprocity is a possible
motivational force for second-mover behavior. Furthermore, the response function of the Cox-
Friedman-Gjerstad model is ￿ exible enough, in principle, to rationalize the shape of the observed
average response functions shown in Figure 2. Therefore, as a robustness check of our ￿nding
that team second-movers are less (myopically) rational than individual second-movers in the 15-
period treatments, we also estimated the model put forward by Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad. We
present the details in Section C of the Web Appendix, but note here that the estimation results
show that the ￿emotional state￿ of groups is more pronounced (both positively and negatively)
than that of individuals. In particular, an estimated reciprocity parameter is signi￿cantly larger in
18We apply Wald test for testing parameter signi￿cance. We ￿rst accommodate data from di⁄erent treatments
into a large, unrestricted model. Then we put restrictions on coe¢ cients to see whether they are equal to zero.
22Truly Sequential Play Strategy Method
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LL ￿426.523 ￿196.848 ￿4149.451 ￿3232.943 ￿377.509 ￿241.571








Testing p < 0:001 (￿2
(1) = 40:93) p = 0:006 (￿2
(1) = 7:634) p = 0:002 (￿2
(1) = 9:82)
Table 5: Estimation results for Lau-Leung￿ s implementation of the Fehr and Schmidt model
the groups treatments than in the corresponding individual-player treatments. Hence, the results
of this robustness exercise show that team followers appear to behave more reciprocally (or less
sel￿shly) than individual followers. This is, again, not in line with our main hypothesis.
5 Discussion
5.1 A potential explanation of the results
Summarizing our results derived so far, we can state the following. In the one-shot treatments
we ￿nd weak evidence that is in line with previous results reported in the literature according to
which groups are closer to the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction than individuals (although
the di⁄erences we ￿nd are small and not signi￿cant). In our 15-period treatments, by contrast, we
￿nd that in comparison to individuals, groups choose lower quantities as ￿rst movers and reward
more and punish harder as second movers. In other words, groups in our repeated game treatments
appear to be less sel￿sh than individuals. This raises the question of how to explain the di⁄erent
results in our and the earlier experiments. We believe that a possible explanation rests on the
observation that there is substantial heterogeneity in subjects￿types, and on the fact that di⁄erent
time horizons were used in our and the earlier experiments.
Regarding heterogeneity of subjects￿types, further below we present substantial evidence
suggesting that most subjects belong to one of three categories: (myopic) pro￿t maximizer (￿PM￿ );
23strategic rewarder and punisher (￿Strat-R&P￿ ); and other-regarding preference-driven rewarder
and punisher (￿Pref-R&P￿ ) (where the other-regarding preference can be, e.g., inequality aversion
or reciprocity). We will identify these types by concentrating on second-mover behavior, which
is easily interpretable. PMs always maximize their payo⁄ in response to any ￿rst-mover choice,
independent of the time horizon of interaction. Strat-R&Ps reward ￿nice￿low leader quantities
and punish ￿greedy￿high leader quantities during all but the ￿nal period, where they revert to
rational best response. These types arguably want to strategically ￿educate￿ leaders to choose
lower quantities, until the ￿nal round where they revert to opportunistic behavior. Hence, PMs
and Strat-R&Ps are indistinguishable in one-shot games. Pref-R&Ps behave like Strat-R&Ps in all
but the last period. Since Pref-R&Ps do not revert to payo⁄-maximizing behavior even in the ￿nal
round, their reward and punishment behavior can be interpreted as stemming from other-regarding
preferences. Note that the existence of such or similar types has been reported in other studies in
the literature (see, e.g., Fischbacher et al. 2001 and especially Reuben and Suetens (in press) for
the existence of Strat-R&Ps and Pref-R&Ps).
Many earlier experiments that report groups to be more sel￿sh than individuals (see Section
2) employ one-shot interaction between subjects. By contrast, we have subjects interact both one-
shot and repeatedly over 15 periods (using random re-matching of individuals and teams). We
believe that the heterogeneity in subjects￿types and the di⁄erent time horizons could explain the
di⁄erent results in our and the earlier experiments. For this purpose, let us ￿rst consider the case
of one-shot interactions. Assume that subjects are one of the three types mentioned above. Of
those, PMs and Strat-R&Ps will behave according to subgame perfect behavior while Pref-R&Ps
will deviate from this behavior by displaying other-regarding concerns. Hence, behavior in inter-
individual one-shot treatments is likely to be a mixture of rational and other-regarding behavior.
However, in the one-shot team treatments it is conceivable that both PMs and Strat-R&Ps convince
the potentially present Pref-R&Ps that deviation from subgame-perfect behavior is not meaningful
in a one-shot interaction. For instance, given the ￿rst mover quantity they might convince a group
member who is an emotion-driven reciprocator to control feelings and to also vote for myopic
best-response behavior. Hence, behavior in inter-group one-shot treatments is likely to be more
homogeneous and more in line with the prediction of standard game theory. This would explain
why in earlier experiments (and to a lesser extent in our experiment) groups were on average found
to be more sel￿sh than individuals.
Consider now the case of multiple-period interactions. In the inter-individual treatments,
24average behavior will be a mixture of other-regarding behavior (displayed by both Pref-R&Ps and
Strat-R&Ps) and PMs. However, in the multiple-period team treatments it is conceivable that
Strat-R&P now side with Pref-R&Ps in an e⁄ort to convince the potentially present PMs that
more cooperative behavior (established by reward and punishment) is the better thing to do in
the sense of achieving higher overall payo⁄s when the game is repeated multiple times (even with
random-matching across periods). Hence, behavior in inter-group multiple-round treatments is
likely to be more homogenous and more in line with cooperative behavior. This would explain
why in our repeated game treatments, groups were on average found to be less (myopically) ￿ra-
tional￿ than individuals.19 We believe that the mechanisms we describe here are applicable to
simultaneous-move dilemma games (such as prisoner￿ s dilemma) and to sequential games that al-
low for competitive and cooperative outcomes (such as dictator, ultimatum, trust, or Stackelberg
games). It is presumably less applicable to so-called ￿Eureka￿ -type problems that have a ￿clear￿
solution that, once discovered, is recognized as such (e.g., limit-pricing or beauty-contest game). In
the remainder of this section we provide evidence for the existence of the di⁄erent types of subjects
mentioned above.
5.2 Evidence for the explanation of the results
The ￿rst kind of evidence is provided by the estimation results of the Lau and Leung (2010) model
presented in Section 4.1.3. There, the term 1 ￿ ￿ns measures the share of ￿standard￿ or best-
response subjects. As this share is estimated to be signi￿cantly larger than 0, no matter which of
the individual-treatment data sets we use, this provides evidence for the existence of myopic pro￿t
maximizers.
The second, more direct evidence is delivered by the inspection of the individual response
functions in Figures 6 and 7 in Section D of the Web Appendix. These Figures show the individual
response functions of second movers in round 14 and 15, respectively, in treatment SM-Ind-15.
Inspecting the response function in Figures 6 and 7, we ￿nd the following categorization. PMs:
Subjects 18, 21, 26, 28, and 30 are pure myopic pro￿t maximizers. Moreover, subjects 15 and 29
also play mostly best response, and could therefore also be classi￿ed as myopic pro￿t maximizer.20
19Note that the mechanism we propose here, where some subjects in a group try to convince other subjects of what
is the ￿right￿thing to do depending on the time horizon, is in line with ￿Persuasive Argument Theory￿(PAT) put
forward in the psychological literature (see, e.g., Stoner, 1961; Teger and Pruitt, 1967; Levine and Moreland, 1998).
PAT suggests that if the mean response of the individuals exhibits a preference towards a particular position, it is
likely that the subjects will be exposed to more persuasive arguments in favor of this position during the discussion.
Therefore, the ex-post group outcome will shift towards that particular initial position.
20Note that in treatment Sm-Team-15 there are only 2 pure pro￿t maximizers (teams 2 and 9), as shown in Figures
25Strat-R& P: In period 14, subject 24 (25) basically plays best response for quantities smaller than 8
(9). In round 15, however, both subjects choose best response behavior for all ￿rst-mover quantities.
Hence, these two subjects can clearly be identi￿ed as strategic players. To a lesser extent, the same
is true for subjects 22 and 23. The remaining subjects consist of those that can be classi￿ed as
Pref-R& P and ￿Others.￿21 Figures 4 and 5 in Section D of the Web Appendix show the complete
response function in the one-shot strategy-method treatments. Most of the response functions we
observe in these Figures show best-reply behavior, which is compatible with behavior described for
PMs and Strat-R&Ps. As some of these observed one-shot response functions also re￿ ect a taste
for rewarding and punishment, we also have evidence for Pref-R&Ps in these treatments.22
The third kind of evidence is provided by the analysis of follower chat protocols. We do this
in view of illustrating two things: that statements made during the group discussions can be (albeit
not exclusively) assigned to subject types mentioned above, and that many of the discussions can be
easily characterized as a con￿ ict between the types of subjects mentioned above. To economize on
space, we only concentrate on followers in the group treatments Seq-Team-15 and Seq-Team-1.
Again, followers￿discussions simply provide ￿richer￿material.
We started the analysis by ￿rst listing all (interpretable) statements, proposals, motives,
etc. that were voiced in any of the group chats in treatment Seq-Team-15. Then we tried to
assign each of these statements to a broader category which would also re￿ ect the type categories
introduced above. These categories were: PM, Strat-R&P, Pref-R&P, Non-PM, and ￿Other￿ .
These categories are the column titles in Table 6, which summarizes our chat analysis of treatment
Seq-Team-15. The complete list of all statements collected under the respective broad category
for treatment Seq-Team-15 is provided in the ￿rst column of Table 11 in the Web Appendix.
Statements summarized in category Non-PM are those that, arguably, belong to either category
Strat-R&P or Pref-R&P. However, an assignment to either of these categories is not unambiguous
which is why we summarize them in a separate category.
The next step of the analysis was to brie￿ y summarize each group￿ s discussion in each
round of treatment Seq-Team-15. It turned out that each discussion can be summarized by one
of eight headlines, which provide the row titles in the upper part of Table 6. Here ￿R￿stands for
8 and 9 in Appendix D. Hence, we observe a lower share of pro￿t maximizers in the team treatment than in the
individual treatment. This is consistent with our explanation above according to which, through team discussions,
PMs are likely to be convinced to abandon their behavior in favor of some sort of reward-and-punishment behavior.
21These results are con￿rmed by a hierarchical agglomerative cluster analysis (see Kaufman and Rousseeuw, 1990)
of individual response functions. The details are available from the authors upon request.
22Note that the standard deviation of responses to speci￿c leader quantities is usually larger for individuals than
for groups, which is in line with our explanation put forward in the previous section.
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Overall characterization







Quick agreement on R 23 ￿ 1 5 30 6
Quick agreement on PM 90 94 ￿ 3 5 3
Quick agreement on P 15 ￿ 2 13 13 7
PM vs R, R ￿wins￿ 10 18 19 9 12 2
PM vs R, PM ￿wins￿ 5 9 9 3 8 2
PM vs P, P ￿wins￿ 20 23 10 13 16 8
PM vs P, PM ￿wins￿ 7 20 1 4 6 5
How much P? 10 3 1 3 10 6
￿ 180 167 (41.5%) 43 (10.7%) 53 (13.2%) 100 (24.9%) 39 (9.7%)
Leaders￿Choices
qL = 6 12 18 10 10 9 4
qL = 7 42 31 13 6 34 5
qL = 8 79 79 2 7 6 4
qL = 9 4 ￿ 2 ￿ 5 3
qL = 10 14 11 3 9 15 8
qL = 11 9 11 4 5 8 5
qL = 12 20 17 9 16 23 10
￿ 180 167 43 53 100 39
Notes: Abbreviations used: R = Reward, PM = Pro￿t maximization, P = Punishment. Percentages in
row ￿￿￿ refer to percentages of cases in the columns labeled ￿Categories of motives mentioned in group
discussions￿ .
Table 6: Analysis of chat protocols in treatment SM-Team-15
reward, ￿PM￿for pro￿t maximization, and ￿P￿for punishment, respectively. The upper half of
Table 6 is a cross table of the short summaries of chat contents (column 1) and the broad categories
of statements made during the chats (row 2). For instance, in the 23 cases that a round￿ s chat
could be summarized as ￿quick agreement on R￿in treatment Seq-Team-15, there was 1 statement
attributable to a Strat-R&P motive, 5 statements attributable to a Pref-R&P motive, 30 statements
attributable to Non-PM motive, and 6 statements that could not be summarized under a common
headline.23 A di⁄erent cross table is provided in the lower half of Table 6. Here we cross the leader
groups￿quantity choices with the broad categories of statements made in treatment Seq-Team-15.
(A more detailed overview of the cross table is provided in Tables 11 and 12 in the Web Appendix).
The understandably less extensive categorization for treatment Seq-Team-1 is provided in Table
7, which has a similar structure as 6.
With these preparations in place, we can come back to the two points (see second paragraph
23Note that the sum of these statements do not sum up to 23, the number of observations listed in column 2 in
Table 6. This is so because typically many di⁄erent statements were made during one group￿ s discussion in a single
round of the experiment.
27Categories of motives men-
tioned in group discussions
Overall characterization
of a round￿ s discussion # Obs. PM
Non-
PM Other
PM vs R, PM ￿wins￿ 2 4 2 ￿
PM vs P, P ￿wins￿ 2 3 4 1
PM vs P, PM ￿wins￿ 2 6 2 5
￿ 6 13 (48.1%) 8 (29.6%) 6 22.2(%)
Leaders￿Choices
qL = 6 1 2 1 ￿
qL = 8 2 5 2 2
qL = 10 1 1 1 1
qL = 12 2 5 4 3
￿ 6 13 8 6
Notes: Abbreviations used: R = Reward, PM = Pro￿t maximization, P = Punishment. Percentages in
row ￿￿￿ refer to percentages of cases in the columns labeled ￿Categories of motives mentioned in group
discussions￿ .
Table 7: Analysis of chat protocols in treatment SM-Team-1
of this subsection) we want to illustrate with the help of the chat protocols. Let us concentrate
on Table 6, which shows the results for treatment Seq-Team-15. First, we observe that also
in the chat protocols we ￿nd ample evidence for various types of subjects. In fact, the column
sums in the upper (or lower) part of Table 6 suggest that respectively 41.5%, 10.7%, and 13.2%
of all interpretable statements made in treatment Seq-Team-15 stem from subjects who can,
respectively, be classi￿ed as (myopic) pro￿t maximizers, strategic teachers, and other-regarding
subjects. Second, row-wise inspection of Table 6 illustrates the con￿ icts that are carried out in
group discussions. Surely, and almost tautologically, in cases in which there is quick agreement on
an action we typically observe only one kind of argument. For instance, if there is quick agreement
on best response (which typically happens in response to leader quantity 7 or 8, see the lower
part of Table 6) there are almost no statements made in favor of a di⁄erent action. On the other
hand, if there is quick agreement on either reward or punishment, no statement is made in favor
of best response. The more interesting cases arise, of course, when a group￿ s discussion can be
characterized as a con￿ ict between best response and a rewarding or a punitive action. In these
cases we typically observe arguments and statements that can be attributed to all kinds of motives
ranging from myopic pro￿t maximization to strategic teaching to other-regarding and non-pro￿t
maximizing behavior. For instance, in the 10 group discussions that revolve around the question
whether the leader group should be best responded to or be rewarded, and rewarding is the result
28(see the row labeled ￿PM vs R, R ￿wins￿ ￿in Table 6), we observe 18 statements made in favor
of pro￿t maximization, and, respectively, 19, 9, and 12 statements in favor of strategic teaching,
other-regarding motives, and non-pro￿t maximization behavior. Not surprisingly, as there are many
more statements made against best response, in these cases a response is chosen that rewards the
leader￿ s action. Similar patterns can be observed in the other discussions that are characterized by
con￿ icts among group members. Note the fact that in con￿ ict-laden group discussions it is typically
the case that all kinds of arguments are exchanged, which can be seen by reading row-wise the lower
part of Table 6. For instance in response to the collusive leader quantity qL = 6;, we see statements
coming from all ￿camps.￿This applies likewise for higher leader quantities (￿ 10).
6 Summary and concluding remarks
In this study we compare the behavior of individuals and groups in a sequential market game in both
one-period and multiple-period game treatments. Our main ￿nding is the di⁄erential e⁄ect that the
time horizon of interaction has on the extent of individual and group players￿(non)conformity with
subgame perfectness. In the one-shot treatments we ￿nd that, although on average groups appear
to be somewhat closer to subgame perfectness than individuals, none of the di⁄erences in behavior
are statistically signi￿cant. However, in the repeated game treatments we ￿nd that groups are less
sel￿sh and more cooperative than individuals. These ￿ndings are to a large extent independent of
the mode in which we elicit choices or the model we employ to account for second-mover behavior.
Importantly, our main ￿nding is in (stark) contrast to results in earlier studies reporting that groups
appear to be more sel￿sh than individuals. A possible explanation for the di⁄erent results in our and
earlier studies is that there is heterogeneity in subjects￿types, ranging from pure (myopic) pro￿t
maximization to either strategic or preference-driven reward-and-punishment behavior. Depending
on the time horizon of the interaction, the exchange of persuasive arguments via discussions is likely
to lead groups to (possibly) more sel￿sh behavior in one-shot interactions and to more cooperative
behavior in repeated interactions. Since subjects in inter-individual interactions cannot exchange
arguments regarding what constitutes ￿meaningful￿ behavior in the face of di⁄erent features of
the interaction, it is conceivable that their behavior reacts to a lesser extent to the time horizon of
interaction. Our main result implies that the statement ￿Groups, it seems, are more sel￿sh and more
sophisticated players than individuals, and, as a result, interactions between two unitary groups
are closer to the rational, game-theoretical solution than interactions between two individuals.￿
29(Bornstein 2008, p. 30), which summarizes much of the previous literature on interindividual and
intergroup comparisons in simple, sequential-move games, needs modi￿cation.
Our results show that the second part of the above statement does not generally apply
to multiple-period game settings. In fact, for games that leave relatively more room for other-
regarding preferences, the time horizon of interaction seems important, leading the play of groups
either closer or further away from the game-theoretic prediction than that of individuals. In the
light of our results, and to the extent that the explanation of our results is convincing, it might
be worthwhile to revisit other simple sequential-move games (such as the ultimatum game, the
trust game, the centipede game, and the gift-exchange game) to check for a possible di⁄erential
e⁄ect of the time horizon of interaction. Whereas we concentrate on the e⁄ect of the time horizon
of interaction in interindividual and intergroup comparisons, much more research is called for to
analyze the e⁄ect of other design features such as the nature of communication within groups (e.g.,
face-to-face or anonymous chat) or the voting mechanism (e.g., majority or unanimity voting).24
The Stackelberg market game is, arguably, not of the ￿Eureka￿type, where a solution once
found is recognized as such by players. Therefore the results of our repeated markets are not
necessarily in contrast to the ￿ndings summarized by the second quote in the Introduction, which
summarizes results from repeated interaction in games with a strong ￿Eureka￿ component. In
these games, behavior of groups was shown to converge much faster to the (same) game-theoretic
prediction than individuals. However, our repeated-game results show that neither groups nor
individuals converge to a (re￿ned) game-theoretic prediction, and, what is more, that groups clearly
diverge further from it than individuals (see also Cox and Hayne, 2006 and Sutter et al. 2009).
It is one question to check who is closer to game-theoretic predictions in interindividual and
intergroup comparisons; another is to check who earns higher pro￿ts. In particular and perhaps
not surprisingly, there does not seem to be a simple relationship between higher conformity with
game-theoretic predictions and higher pro￿ts. For instance, Feri et al. (2010) show that groups are
signi￿cantly better at coordinating on more e¢ cient outcomes and hence earn higher pro￿ts than
individuals, while Bornstein et al. (2004) show that groups exit earlier in one-shot centipede games,
leading to lower pro￿ts in comparison to individuals. On the other hand, Cox and Hayne (2006) and
Sutter et al. (2009) show that in some auction formats, groups pay higher prices than individuals and
are more often victim of the winner￿ s curse than individuals, and therefore groups make smaller
24Some studies, such as Elbittar et al. (2004), Gillet et al. (2009, 2011), vary the nature of managerial decision-
making processes within ￿rms and analyze their impact on intergroup and interindividual ￿rm behavior.
30pro￿ts than individuals. In our repeated Stackelberg markets employing truly sequential play,
however, we ￿nd that groups earn signi￿cantly higher total pro￿ts than individuals, although
groups￿behavior is further away from the (re￿ned) game theoretic prediction. These results seem
to suggest that more research is needed to explore when (type of game, etc.) and why (design
features, ease of collusion, etc.) groups earn more than individuals. The answer to this question
is important for a recommendation on when to entrust decision making to groups instead of to
individuals in real-world settings.
Our results also speak to the extensive psychological literature on individual-versus-group
decision making, especially regarding the so-called ￿discontinuity e⁄ect.￿This e⁄ect, which so far
largely rests on observations in one-shot prisoner￿ s dilemma games, refers to the ￿nding of ￿in-
tergroup interactions to be more competitive, or less cooperative, than interindividual relations￿
(Wildschut and Insko, 2007, p. 175, emphasis added). Clearly, the results of our 15-period treat-
ments show that, indeed, there is a clear di⁄erence or discontinuity between inter-individual and
inter-group interaction. However, our results also show that the ￿discontinuity￿goes in the opposite
direction than stated so far in the psychology literature. Hence, the de￿nition of the discontinu-
ity e⁄ect might need modi￿cation too, accommodating, among other things, the time horizon of
interaction.25
In this paper, we also make progress in terms of methodology regarding the comparison
of interindividual and intergroup behavior. First, we study both one-shot and multiple-period
treatments in a uni￿ed framework, whereas other studies either only implement one-period or only
multiple-period games. Second, in an additional set of treatments we employ the strategy-method to
control for the possibility that di⁄erences in second-mover behavior observed across interindividual
and intergroup treatments are driven by the di⁄erent experiences second movers have in the two
environments. This also enables us to uncover the complete shape of the response function used
by experienced Stackelberg followers. Independent of whether they were elicited from individual
or group followers, average response functions in repeated Stackelberg markets display the same
characteristic pattern. They slope downward for lower leader quantities, slope upward around the
Cournot quantity and slope downward again for larger leader quantities. These results imply that
it may not be warranted to just run linear regressions to estimate followers￿response functions in
repeated games, as done for instance in Huck et al. (2001).26 Interestingly, the speci￿c shape of
25Note that Lodewijkx et al. (2006) discuss the possibility that di⁄erent time horizons may have di⁄erential e⁄ects
on interindividual versus intergroup comparisons. However, they do not provide persuasive evidence for this claim.
26It remains to be checked whether similar unexpected patterns can be observed in other sequential-move games,
31followers￿response functions is nicely predicted by models of other-regarding preferences, such as
Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Building on earlier contributions by Lau and Leung (2010) and Cox
et al. (2007), we demonstrate that experienced followers￿response functions are more adequately
accounted for by estimating structural models of other-regarding preferences rather than by simple
linear regressions. This allows us to unambiguously test which of two response functions is closer to
the best-reply function, which can be viewed as a third methodological contribution of our paper.
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